TEXAS TOWER RADAR PLATFORMS-EARLY WARNING SEABOUND SENTINELS

THE EASTERN RADAR DEFENSE

"SILENT SENTINELS AT SEA"

TEXAS TOWERS

Texas Towers, so-called because of their resemblance to oil drilling platforms in the Gulf Of Mexico, were huge manned platforms to serve as radar sites. Five Texas Towers were were originally planned to be built off the Atlantic coast, extending radar coverage seaward. Three were eventually built, TT-1 and TT-5 were never built. Besides TT-4, lost in the tragedy, the towers never lived up to Air Force expectations.

The Air Force originally planned for the towers to be continuously manned by twenty-two men. This number proved to be grossly inadequate; by 1957, a crew, normally consisting of six officers and forty-eight airmen staffed each tower. Not only radar men, but also personnel for plumbing, refrigeration, medical and cooking chores manned the stations.

THE TEXAS TOWER FEATURE ON EARLY NEWSREEL SHOWING THE US NAVY SUPPLING THE REMOTE RADAR POST WAY OUT IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

The Air Force occupied TT-2, 110 miles off Cape Cod, in December, 1955. Tower and crew alike suffered the effects of constant vibration from the rotation of the radar antenna and the diesel generators. The surrounding water, and footings driven into the ocean floor even transmitted distant sounds up the steel legs to be amplified through the whole structure.
The Texas Towers were originally equipped with one AN/FPS-3 search radars and two AN/FPS-6 height finder Conception and Approval, 1952-1953. Fastening radar platforms to the ocean floor was first studied in the summer of 1952. MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory analyzed the feasibility of stationing search and height-finding radars on giant metal towers planted at intervals along the ocean bottom, similar to oil-drilling rigs employed in the Gulf of Mexico. Lincoln Laboratory concluded that a cluster of such Texas Towers might, in fact, profitably serve air defense purposes if erected about 100 miles off the northeastern coast of the Atlantic seaboard. There, elevation of the ocean floor, owing to the continental shelf, conveniently afforded areas shallow enough, yet far enough at sea, to be strategically important. Being fixed installations, Texas Towers could accommodate heavy duty, long-range radars like those used on land, instead of lighter, medium range sets like those used aboard picket vessels.

That the preponderant amount of America’s high priority targets were situated inside the U.S. northeastern industrial complex—within easy striking distance of the Atlantic coast—made the stakes involved that much more serious. Advance warning furnished by Texas Towers, in combination with other elements of the growing early warning network, including Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft together with Navy radar picket ships, promised to reduce America’s vulnerability to surprise attack. Simultaneously, target tracking information supplied by Texas Towers would enable ADC’s control centers to vector fighter aircraft to intercept unknown targets far out at sea, where hostile bombers could be destroyed long before reaching bomb release lines. In conjunction with AEW&C aircraft and Navy picket ships, Texas Towers would contribute to extending contiguous east-coast radar coverage some 300 to 500 miles seaward. In terms of the air threat of the 1950’s, this meant a gain of at least 30 extra minutes warning time of an oncoming bomber attack.1
ADC found no complaint with Lincoln Laboratory’s recommendation that five Texas Towers be installed. Lincoln obligingly named the five sites best suited for positioning radars: (1) Nantucket Shoal (Lat. 40°45’N., 69°19’W., 80foot depth) 100 miles southeast of Rhode Island; (2) Georges Shoal (Lat. 41°44’N. , Long. 67°47’W. , 56-foot depth) , 110 miles east of Cape Cod; (3) Cashes Ledge (Lat. 42°53’N., Long. 68°57’W., 36-foot depth), 100 miles east of New Hampshire; (4) Brown’s Bank (Lat. 42°47’N., Long. 65°37’W., 84foot depth), 75 miles south of Nova Scotia; (5) Unnamed Shoal (Lat. 39°48’N., Long. 72°40’W., 185-foot depth), 84 miles southeast of New York City.

In September 1952, ADC voiced its desire that USAF favorably consider the proposed Texas Tower layout for future implementation. USAF first looked into the legality of positioning fixed radar platforms on the high seas, whereupon the Judge Advocate ruled that no violation of international law would result from their placement adjacent to territorial waters. Upon deliberating on the other aspects concerned, USAF, too, became convinced of their necessity and, in the autumn of 1953. authorized construction of all five. Accordingly, funds were budgeted for them during Fiscal Years.1954 and 1955; the Navy’s Bureau of Yards and Docks was vested with authority to conduct ocean surveys, execute design engineering, draw up specifications, and perform the other services requisite to letting out contract work to the lowest competent bidder.2 Groundwork for Implementation, 1953-1955. All manner of things had to be determined before precise specifications detailing internal and external dimensions—could be drawn up for release to competitive bidders. There was the matter of deciding how many and what types of personnel to people the towers with. Types of equipment to install had to be settled beforehand: not only surveillance and communications kinds for operational purposes, but also food preparation and recreational kinds, among others, for logistic and morale purposes. How to replenish, with some regularity, expendable commodities and other supply items, required thoughtful consideration, so as to strike a proper balance between overloading and under-supplying each tower. These and other questions raised by the concept of sticking Texas Towers radars 100 or so miles from shore constituted problems of no mean proportion, which ADC, in the early 1950’s, speedily came to grips with. Manpower totals for sustaining three-shift, round-the-clock operations was no easy figure to compute. Initially, ADC had in mind remoting tower radar data, via submarine cable, from tower to shore, where the weapons control function of vectoring interceptors would be handled by the crew at the parent ACW shore site. This, accordingly, lessened the number of persons whose presence would be needed for tower duty. First, in September 1952, a crew of 22 men was postulated as a likely number for maintaining continuous operations, presupposing that Texas Towers would have no target identification or weapons control responsibilities. This estimate climbed to 25 in August 1953, to provide technicians for servicing the second of two height-finders programmed. A few months later, in November 1953, the personnel contingent was re-estimated at 27, upped next to 41 in July 1954. It then developed that no submarine cable would be strung for remoting, that existing “slowed down” video could not be made to work properly in its stead, and that too much time would be consumed either fabricating or adapting old equipment to this purpose. ADC therefore was obliged to change heart, electing to program control functions at each tower, together with the attendant increase in personnel this entailed. Until near the end of the decade, when the Texas Towers were scheduled convert to SAGE operations (whereby the Lincoln Fine System, AN/FST-2, would be installed to feed lance data automatically from the tower to specified SAGE centers), the Texas Towers were to operate manually, utilizing GPA-37 consoles for vectoring interceptors to their respective targets. Consequently, personnel estimates were upped again in January 1955, this time to 46 in all, to each tower with personnel enough to handle the control function, along with the other conventional surveillance duties. Space enough was allowed during the stages (late 1954-1955) to accommodate upwards of 72 which was fortunate considering that the size of the personnel force continued growing. In mid-1956, after first tower was erected, the staffing structure was hiked from 46 to 49 officers and airmen for sustaining Texas Tower missions. Even this later proved inadequate by five spaces, as evidenced by a staffing pattern in 1957 calling for a total of 54, composed of six officers and 48 airmen. This large a contingent embraced personnel not only to operate and maintain the surveillance, control, and communications equipment, together with specialists in the plumbing, heating, refrigeration, medical and cooking business to help keep body and soul alive,

 but also to fill unique spaces, insofar as ADC was concerned, peculiar to the Texas Tower mission. Into this latter class was categorized the slot for one S/Sgt (Staff Sergeant) “seaman” and one A/lC (Airman First Class) “marine engineman” to handle maritime matters associated with Texas Tower operations. So specialized were some of these maritime support jobs, that ADC, until subsequently discouraged by USAF, showed interest in a 1956 proposal to transfer the entire Texas Tower program—operations, maintenance and all—to the Navy Department.
Besides the commander, who was ordinarily a captain, something like three to four officer weapons controllers (AFSC 1644), together with half a dozen or so airmen ACW operators working under them, and nearly an equal number of radar repairmen under charge of an electronics officer (AFSC 3044), were assigned each crew. Communications operators and technician repairmen were well represented, too. Each crew was divided into three shifts.

One thing ADC insisted on regarding personnel manning was the right to form two crews per tower. ADC desired to alternate on-station tower duty so that no single crew spent more than one month aboard a Texas Tower without time, the following month, spent ashore, when the second of two crews took its month’s turn, on a rotational basis. Tower duty, incidentally, counted as time aggregated on an isolated overseas tour.
But USAF was reluctant to authorize the extra spaces that this two-crew plan entailed. The most USAF would bend, was a 1.5 crew manning ratio per tower. ADC persevered in reaffirming need for a 2.0 crew manning ratio, and eventually resorted to improvising the difference by borrowing from its own resources.3

Determining what kind of equipment to install was more easily determined, particularly with regard to surveillance equipment. Precedents for selecting search and height-finding radars already existed in the form of ADC’s ground-based AC&W sites. Drawing from its experience with them, ADC picked the FPS-3A long-range search set (modified subsequently to the FPS-20A configuration), and two FPS-6 long-range height-finders. For protection from wind, rain and snow, all three antennas were to be enclosed in arctic tower radomes composed of a rubberized dome sprouting bulbously 55 feet in diameter, and supported underneath by a walled framework. These helped characterize the shape TexasTowers finally assumed, silhouetting a clover-leaf profile on stilts.
Ordinarily, installation of a pair of FPS-6 height finders and an FPS-3A search set entailed separating them at least 150 feet apart, for good reasons. If bunched closely together, there was a real danger of mutual electronic interference being generated when radar antennas faced one another. An exception to this rule, however, had to be made aboard Texas Towers, where surface space, of necessity, was constricted. To minimize chances of mutual interference, yet compactly squeeze all equipment atop a relatively small surface, the FPS-3A search set, sandwiched between the other two, was elevated so as to tower above them. The two FPS-6 antennas, moreover, were pointed in opposite directions, one facing toward land, the other toward sea, being slaved together, and to the FPS-3A, for synchronizing movements. As a final measure of precaution, interference blankers were installed to blot out electronic signals emanating from FPS-6 antennas when pointing toward the FPS-3A.4 Tower-to-shore communications presented a problem different from that of radars. There simply was no network of telephone lines conveniently at hand to tap into, as at ACW stations on land. Notwithstanding this, the question was settled long in advance of tower erection time. ADC originally wanted-to string submarine cables from tower to shore at a cost estimated at first to be $1,000,000 per tower. Follow-on estimates that nearly doubled this amount, however, helped doom the submarine cable plan. Another system equally favored by ADC was adopted for primary point-to-point communications: multiple-channel tropospheric scatter radio, described in more detail below.5 After the size of the forthcoming personnel contingent and of the equipment inventory was, for the most part, known, work proceeded on the platform to accommodate them. Beforehand, the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks had contracted core-drilling work in July 1954 to the De Long Corporation and the Raymond Concrete Pile Company. Feasibility studies, on 18 June 1954, were farmed out to the architect-engineering firms of Moran, Proctor, Mueser and Rutledge of New York City, and the Anderson-Nichols and Company of Boston. These studies were soon completed and, by October 1954, their results submitted. Hereupon, the Bureau of Yards and Docks contracted with the same firms to formulate the engineering and design work for five towers. They were expressly designed to withstand 125-mile per hour winds and 35-foot high waves.
Texas Tower 2. Responsibility for constructing the first Texas Tower was entrusted to Bethlehem Steel Company. By then, each of the five approved sites had been designated as follows: Cashes Ledge was named TT-1 (for Texas Tower 1); Georges Shoal, TT-2; Nantucket Shoal, TT-3; Unnamed Shoal, TT-4; and Brown’s Bank, TT-5. This numbering sequence, however, was not indicative of site-erection priorities. Indeed, it was TT-2, Georges Shoal that ADC chose for its first Texas Tower. Situated some 110 miles east of Cape Cod, the TT-2 unit, besides enjoying a location in shallow waters that would help facilitate its erection, was to be among the first of ADC’s radar units to tie into the emerging SAGE network.6

THE NEW YORK AIR DEFENSE SECTOR WITH THE TWO TOWERS TT-3 TT-4 JUST OFF LONG ISLAND TT-3 SERVED BY THE ELECTRONIC WARNING SQUADRON BASED OUT OF MONTAUK AIR STATION

TEXAS TOWER No.3 OFF LONG ISLAND

By the spring of 1955 Bethlehem Steel had completed the first platform at its Quincy, Massachusetts facility. The steel platform was shaped into an equilateral triangle with cropped ends, measuring 210 feet along all three sides, providing about half an acre of surface area. So that it would conveniently house programmed personnel and equipment, combined with stores, reserves, and spare parts essential for long-term stays, the platform was welded into a self contained, compartmentalized unit 20-feet high, subdivided into separate decks. The bottom-most deck was employed mainly for maintenance and storage space, where tanks and pumps were located. The next deck was partitioned into living quarters, a galley and mess hall, administrative offices, heating and air conditioning areas, recreational areas, food storage space, a dispensary and library. Atop this, across approximately half the wedge-shaped platform, was the helicopter landing area. Occupying the rest of the triangle was the uppermost operations deck, some 210 feet long by 60 feet wide, rising 12 feet above the rest of the 20-foot high platform. Inside this deck was the surveillance and control operations area, on top of which would be perched the three radar antennas enveloped by pressurized arctic towers. Equipped with radars and other gear, the platform, weighed 6,500 tons or so.7
Transporting the first platform from shore to site was a toilsome task. There was trouble enough launching it into water, let alone hauling it to sea. Yet, by June 1955, it was successfully floated and fitted for its sea voyage. Responsibility for towing it to site and then erecting it, was vested in the Raymond and De Long Companies, who embarked with their charge on 12 July 1955. Within two days time, they arrived on site. Hereupon, temporary legs were dropped to the shoal (about 55 feet under water); the tower platform was jacked up to rest on the temporary legs high above the water, while the three permanent legs, or caissons were readied. Each of the three tubular legs was designed for lasting support, measuring over 160 feet long, the first 48 or so feet of which were ensconced snugly into the shoal, the middle 55 feet of which remained immersed in water, and the top 60 or so feet of which rose above the water’s surface, lifting the platform high and out of harm’s way. The legs were versatile enough to be logistically, as well as architecturally purposeful. For inside each steel leg was incased a 140-foot long steel tube six feet in diameter where thousands of gallons of fluid reserves, mostly water and fuel oil, might be stored, surrounded by a jacket of concrete over two feet thick. One of the three hollow legs contained seawater tapped for conversion to drinking water. To this end, distillation equipment was included for producing several gallons of fresh water per minute.8 By the end of 1955, TT-2 was assembled, with bolts tightened and the rest shipshape enough for USAF to assume beneficial occupancy. This it did, effective 2 December 1955. The FPS-3A and twin FPS-6 height radars, as programmed, were brought aboard and installed. They detected targets of B-47 size, flying about 50,000 feet, up to 200 nautical miles away. But the same targets flying at low altitudes say 500 feet—because of line-of-sight radar characteristics, were discernible by radar only up to 50 nautical miles away. It was for this reason, among others, that airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft later patrolled certain off-shore stations to cover low-altitude radar gaps over looked by Texas Towers, picket vessels, and shore-based radars.9

Along with the radars arrived the communications equipment, without which Texas Towers, being unable to transmit their findings to shore, would be incapacitated. Foremost among this equipment came the point-to-point, FRC-56 tropospheric scatter system. Three parabolic-disk antennas, measuring 28 feet in diameter, were mounted vertically, side by side, along the platform edge supporting the operations deck. Two at a time were utilized for transmitting messages, while all three combined received them. The signals were deflected from the tropospheric layer of Earth’s atmosphere, between the 30,000 and 60,000-foot level. A wide spectrum of ultra-high frequencies was thus exploitable without recourse to expensive intermediate relay stations. Normally unaffected by atmospheric disturbances, the tropospheric scatter radio system worked well in the manual system for distances up to about 200 miles, and was intended to serve equally as well for automated SAGE communications later to come. At either end of the system, telephone circuits were patched in so that voice communications could be reliably maintained.
Apart from this primary point-to-point system, there was installed conventional BF radio equipment for tower-to-shore backup communications, and UHF and VHF radio equipment for tower-to-air communications. Teletype, cryptographic, telephonic intercommunications and public-address systems were incorporated as well, together with certain aircraft radio navigational devices. GPA-37 equipment was integrated to facilitate weapons control operations. To power the communications, navigation and radar equipment thus brought aboard, eleven 250 KW diesel generators were rigged so that less than half of them, operating in unison, would supply sufficient electricity during any given time. Air conditioning units were furnished to prevent certain of the equipment from over-heating.10
Site P-10 (762 ACW Squadron) at North Truro AFS, Massachusetts, was designated the parent station for TT-2. Operational concepts governing their relationships were diligently spelled out in a full-dress operations plan, first published by ADC in July 1954, later revised in July 1956. Other matters were carefully worked out, such as methods for transportation and supply. Two H-21B helicopters per tower were authorized by USAF, four of which were based at Otis AFB and two, at Suffolk County AFB. The twin-rotor H-21B had a theoretical capacity for carrying 10 passengers or 2,000 pounds of freight. When equipped with necessary flotation and survival gear, however, the H-21B’s capacity was cut to eight persons or 1,550 pounds of freight. Other cargo, particularly POL, was furnished periodically by ship. Fuel, food and lubricants,were stocked to provide at least a 30-day reserve; spare parts were on hand for operational equipment to last 45 days On 7 May 1956, TT-2 achieved the status of a limited operationally ready aircraft control and warning station. For purposes of furnishing logistical support for TT-2, and for the others when the need arose, the 4604 AC&W Squadron (Texas Towers) was activated 8 October, 1956 at Otis AFB, Massachusetts, which two months later (December 1956), was re-designated the 4604th Support Squadron (Texas Towers).11
Texas Towers 3 and 4. Meanwhile, by November 1955, bids for the next two towers had been accepted. Construction contracts for both of them were awarded J. Rich Steers, Inc. of New York City in collaboration with Morrison-Knudsen, Inc., of Boise, Idaho. Except for minor changes (including longer legs and increased storage capacity for diesel oil), these two practically duplicated the configuration and basic arrangement of TT-2.
Because of future commitments to integrate Texas Towers into upcoming SAGE centers during the late 1950’s, ADC picked TT-3 at Nantucket Shoal, and TT-4 at Unnamed Shoal, for its next two towers. This left only TT-1 (Cashes Ledge) and TT-5 (Brown’s Bank) unaccounted for. USAF, for purposes of economizing, was anxious to rid the program of them both.

At first, ADC resisted all attempts in this direction. Then, in late 1956, because of the promise of increased off-shore radar coverage by coastal AC&W squadrons in the vicinity, where TT-1 and TT-5 were scheduled to go, ADC agreed to drop TT-1 and TT-5 from all further consideration, leaving three towers, TT-2,TT-3 and TT-4, in the program.12
In 1956 and 1957, work proceeded on TT-3 and 4. Platform and legs of TT-3 were readied by mid-1956, launched the night of 7 August 1956, and towed to Nantucket Shoal and erected that same month. On 29 November 1956, ADC assumed beneficial occupancy. Next month the superstructure and main supports of TT-4 were under construction at South Portland, Maine. These were completed by mid-1957, then, starting 28 June 1957, were towed to sea and placed at Unnamed Shoal. ADC gained beneficial occupancy in November 1957.
The New Life. During these same years (1956-1957), personnel serving at TT‑2 — then functioning manually on a limited operational status—were learning of peculiarities uniquely associated with Texas Tower duty. For one thing, the metal superstructure seemed to vibrate constantly. As the FPS-20A long-range radar antenna (converted from the original FPS-3A model), continued unceasingly to spin (except when out of commission for maintenance), the diesel generators, to grind out their power, and the other equipment, to crank away at their appointed tasks, TT-2 rattled vibrantly from the ordeal. Standing like a three-pronged tuning fork, the tower resonated with noises that spread farther, and amplified greater, than initially occasioned by their source. Matters were not improved when, every half-minute or so during the frequent fogs, the dismal-sounding foghorn croaked out its forlorn message.
Still worse, since it affected operations, was the phenomenon of temperature inversion suffered mostly in summertime. This caused loss of radar coverage, creating, in certain instances, permanent echoes that obscured or distorted radarscope reception. On occasion, equipment components generated electromagnetic disturbances that interfered with, or disrupted, operations of other electronics apparatus. Notwithstanding these and other shortcomings, tower crews became inured to those problems not susceptible of change. And TT-2, effective 17 April 1958, became fully operational manually, then in September 1958, operational as a SAGE unit. TT-3 followed suit in October 1958. TT-4, in mid-April 1959, was declared manually operational, and in April 1960, SAGE operational. Cost of the towers, including platform, legs, radars and communications equipment was reckoned at around $13 million each, and with operating expenses figuring about $1.5 million annually thereafter. TT-3 reported to, and comprised an annex of the 773rd AC&-W Squadron (Montauk, New York);

BESIDES TAKING CARE OF TT-3 MONTAUK AIR STATION WAS A VERY IMPORTANT COLD WAR EARLY WARNING STATION EQUIPPED WITH ONE OF THE LARGEST RADAR DISH USED IN THE UNITED STATES NORAD AND SAC USED THE INFORMATION GATHERED FROM THIS STATION IN REAL TIME.

THE 773rd MONTAUK AIR STATION

RADAR DISH ABOARD TEXAS TOWER

RADAR RECEIVER ON TEXAS TOWER

 TT-4, the 646th AC&W Squadron (Highlands, New Jersey).13
Communications Difficulties. While the three towers, by 1959, were thus up and operating, all was not well with them. One of the main difficulties centered on the FRC-56 tropospheric scatter communications system. When functioning in the manual system, employing voice communications, tropospheric radio proved sufficiently effective. But faulty communications ensued after FST-2 equipment was installed to automate communications for SAGE operations, wherein tower-to-shore communications were transmitted and received, not by voice, but by pre-coded, digitally computed electronic signals for automatic assimilation by SAGE computers. Since SAGE shore computers were calibrated to reject all except perfectly accurate inputs, the tropospheric system, as then in operation, simply could not accomplish the task. It was decided about this same time not to replace each FPS-20A search set and twin FPS-6 height finders with Frequency Diversity FPS-27 search and FPS-26 height finder sets, as programmed theretofore, because of the expense involved. The FPS-20A’s at TT-2 and TT-3, instead, were later modified with GPA-103 equipment in late 1960, incorporating certain ECCM devices that reshaped their FPS-20A to the FPS67 configuration.
Several remedies, meanwhile, were suggested to correct the problem with communications. One proposal reverted to ADC’s original plan: stretching a submarine cable from shore to each tower. Another solution proposed by the MITRE Corporation looked more toward refining the existing apparatus, so that tropospheric radio, with the addition of Code Translation Data Service (CTDS), would still bear the burden of primary tower-to-shore transmission and reception. CTDS would tolerate greater signal level variations than existing subsystems. American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), which frowned on this idea, was approached with a proposal to take charge, on a contract basis, of maintenance and operation responsibilities for the tropospheric system. While solutions to this problem were under consideration, the three Texas Towers reverted to operating as a manual adjunct, employing voice communications, in the far-flung semi-automated SAGE network.14
In 1960, a proposal was advanced that perhaps would have solved some part of the communications problem, namely the installation aboard Texas Towers of ALRI (Airborne Long Range Inputs) equipment designed to automate the communications process. This plan was soon discarded, for several reasons, not least of which was the dearth of available space for accommodating the ALRI equipment. The same year, all further consideration was dropped of stringing submarine cables, or adding CTDS, leaving only the prospect of AT&T taking charge of maintenance and operations. Antenna realignments combined with improved maintenance, supply, training and operating procedures enhanced tropospheric communications appreciably during 1960, and to all intents and purposes rendered them satisfactory for SAGE as well as for manual operations.15

TEXAS TOWER No.4

Tragedy of TT-4. A problem of inherent stability at Texas Tower 4 loomed so large at this time that it overshadowed all previous Texas Tower problems. Ever since TT-4 was towed to site in mid-1957, it had become an engineering nightmare. To begin with, supports for TT-4 had been made somewhat differently from those fabricated for TT-2 and TT-3, chiefly because of the extra depth involved. Whereas TT-2 and TT-3 stood firmly in relatively shallow waters, 56 and 80 feet, respectively, TT-4 stood in water two to three times deeper, 185 feet to be exact. A series of underwater bracing-s were made to compensate for the extra stresses incurred. But in the process of towing TT-4 to site in June-July 1957, two diagonal braces, vital to lacing the three legs snugly together, were lost. The contractor and the Bureau of Yards and Docks decided to improvise repairs on the spot, rather than return to shore for reworking defective portions. The original design strength, consequently, was not restored. From the time it was erected, Texas Tower 4 wobbled some when under stress caused by brisk winds and waves. Platform motion became the rule rather than the exception. The Navy, in late 1958, conducted underwater surveys of TT-4’s supports, resulting in the discovery that certain collar connection bolts either had sheared or worn loose. The problem was aggravated because the defective portion weakened not only its immediate area, but also shifted considerable stress onto non-defective members. From late 1958 to May 1959, with at least six interruptions due to storms, the contractor effected repairs that stabilized the platform for several months. Four successive storms struck in the winter of 1959-1960, which threatened to undo tower stability all over again. In early 1960, another underwater team was sent down to take stock of things and found certain pins and connections irreparably damaged; whereupon a set of above-water bracings were manufactured and, by August 1960, applied. According to the contractor, original design strength was restored to TT-4 — it could withstand winds up to 125 miles per hour and breaking waves up to 35 feet high. Scarcely a month elapsed, however, when Hurricane “Donna” (12 September 1960) whirled in at forces exceeding design specifications: 132mile per hour winds and breaking waves exceeding 50-foot heights. TT-4, evacuated of all personnel two days before, survived “Donna,” but not without first shaking and rocking a great deal from the impact. Part of TT-4’s superstructure was destroyed; worst of all, below-water bracings were fractured, cutting overall strength to 55 per cent of what it had been built up to prior to “Donna.” Further examination of above and below-water components resulted in a decision to undertake extensive repairs in the spring of 1961. 1 February 1961 was established as the date for complete evacuation of TT-4. Meantime, a maintenance crew of 28 persons -- 14 USAF and 14 contractor repair personnel—were stationed aboard to perform certain repair work. Then on 14 and 15 January 1961, TT-4 was again caught in a storm that battered the tower with winds up to 85 miles per hour and waves up to 35 feet high thrashed its legs. Finally, TT-4 could stand no more. At about 1920 hours the night of 15 January, one of its three legs snapped in half; the remaining two thereupon broke, and the platform, with all hands aboard, sank to the ocean’s bottom.16
Demise of TT-2 and TT-3, 1961-1964. The tragedy of TT-4, as much as anything else, sealed the fate of TT-2 and TT-3. While both remaining towers were immediately checked for safety and structural strength, and pronounced sound in this regard, their days were numbered. This was first hinted in March 1961, when Lieutenant General Robert M. Lee, ADC commander wrote:17

At this time there is no valid reason for abandonment of Texas Towers No. 2 and 3. However, in view of the inherent danger and the current inability to evacuate safely during storm conditions, this headquarters, in conjunction with Headquarters NORAD, will continue to consider the operational requirement for these towers. There is a possibility that, after the ALRI (Automatic Long Range Input) System becomes operational in AEW&Con aircraft, sufficient reliable coverage may be achieved so that the contribution of Texas Towers 2 and 3 to the air defense system will be reduced. In this event, shutdown of the towers, with a resultant elimination of the inherent risk, and saving in money and manpower, may be possible. On the basis of technical advice now available there is no concern for the stability of the towers, but should the result of the engineering survey indicate the existence of any deficiencies, immediate action will be taken to discontinue their operation.
Ultimately, it was decided to do just that: phase out TT-2 and TT-3 when ALRI equipment became operational in the AEW aircraft wing based at Otis AFB, Massachusetts. ALRI, in essence, would automate much more of the off-shore surveillance and weapons control functions along the Atlantic seaboard, and with ALRI-equipped aircraft covering virtually the same area as TT-2 and TT-3, the two towers would become expendable commodities. Until ALRI became operational. However, the command sought to implement the best of all possible escape methods aboard the surviving towers, so that the TT-4 episode would not be repeated. Several experimental methods were considered and all but one were ruled out a — watertight escape capsule. Just such a survival capsule, capable of accommodating seven persons, with food and oxygen enough to last 15 days, was designed by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. Two were made, one for each tower, and they were installed in October 1962. Meantime, tower evacuation criteria were revised, so that all would depart except a seven-man emergency stand-by crew whenever 50-knot winds or 35-foot waves were forecast. A seven-man standby crew was necessitated because of a complication occasioned by Soviet trawlers, which often loitered close by the towers. Without a standby crew to keep guard, Soviet sailors might try to board a fully evacuated tower, then claim possession on grounds of salvage rights. If worse came to worse as regards tower stability during a storm, the seven-man standby crew could scramble into the survival capsule for protection. Even the seven-man crew would evacuate when 70-knot winds, or more, were in the offing. The Coast Guard, in an on-again, off-again commitment, promised to position a vessel, if available, near completely evacuated towers to prevent unauthorized boarding by Soviet mariners.
All this, while the Atlantic Ocean, as if impatient to rid it of the troublesome towers, attacked them from above and below. A succession of storms struck during 1962 and 1963 that forced abandonment of the towers a number of times. Between October 1961 and March 1962, for instance, the towers were evacuated ten times, resulting in loss of the equivalent of 120 operational days. Still later that same year, TT-2 and TT-3 experienced many more evacuations. Also, TT-3 lost at least two inflatable radomes, one of which was blown off the FPS-67 search set in the summer of 1962, and the other of which collapsed over a FPS-6 height-finder in January 1963. Simultaneous with these forces working above, strong ocean currents worked steadily beneath to undermine the foundation of the two towers. Scouring of serious proportions resulted, flushing away rock fill supporting the three legs of each tower down to a depth of 10 feet. Even rock-fill replacement leveled around them in November 1961 failed to stay the action of these underwater forces. The towers, consequently, became far more susceptible to being uprooted by storms of hurricane strength.18
At last, in 1963, ALRI stations became operational in the Atlantic AEW&C aircraft fleet. The JCS, in January 1963, authorized the inactivation of the towers. No longer having a need for TT-2 and TT-3, and still mindful of the catastrophe at TT-4, ADC ordered the two towers dismantled. TT-2 was first to go, being decommissioned 15 January 1963, then stripped of its communications and electronics equipment. Its three legs were dynamited; but the platform, rather than float to shore, plunged to the bottom, denying one salvage company the fruits of its preparations. It was as if the capricious Atlantic, vindictive to the last, pulled down another victim to its murky bottom. TT-3 was decommissioned 25 March 1963, and shortly relieved of its radars and communications equipment. Special care was taken in mid-1964 to save TT-3’s platform, the bottom deck was pumped full of urethane foam, then sealed, to insure floatation. On 6 August 1964, the three legs were blasted out from beneath it, whereupon TT-3 platform plunged into the ocean; cork-like, it then rose to the surface, enabling salvage crews to drag it shoreward. Once and for all, the episode of Texas Towers in air defense was brought to a close.19

IN MEMORY OF THE 28 USAF AND CIVILIANS LOST WHEN TT-4 WENT DOWN INTO THE OCEAN WITH NO SURVIVORS DURING A STORM

FOOTNOTES:

1. ADC Historical Study No. 10, Seaward Extension of Radar 1946-1956, pp. 71-75; ADC, Operational Plan for Texas Towers, 20 Jul 1954 [HRF]; USAF Historical Study No. 126, The Development of Continental Air Defense to 1 September 1954, p. 722. Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Extension of Radar Coverage in the Northeast Coastal Area,” 24 Sep 1952 [Doc 91, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of,ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; USAF Plan, “Planning Guide for Implement of Texas Towers,” 16 Nov 1953 [Doc 93, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; Ltr, USAF to ADC, “Air Defense Program Requirements,” 11 Jan 1954 [Doc 94, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr, USAF to Bureau of Yards & Docks, ‘IFY 1955 Advance Planning Directive - Texas Towers,” 8 Mar 1954 [Doc 95, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955); ADC Historical Study No. 10, pp. 71-72; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, P. 70; USAF Historical Study No. 126, pp. 72-73.
3. See Appendix A for Texas Tower manning structure; Ltr, ARDC to ADC, “Project Texas Towers,” 26 Sep 1952 [Doc 90, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Texas Towers,” 24 Aug 1953 [Doc 92, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; USAF, “Planning Guide for Implementation of Texas Towers,” 16 Nov 1953 [Doc 93, Dov Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; IOCY M&O (ADC) to C&E, et.al., “Change to Detachment Manning to be for Texas Towers,” -27 Jan 1955] IOC M&O, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; ADC, “Operational Plan for Texas Towers,” 1 Jul 1956 [HRF]; Ltr, EADF to ADC, “Information for Guidance of Officers and Airmen Selected for Assignment to 762ACWRON w/Duth Station at Georges Shoal Tower Annex (T-2),” 23 Nov 1956 [HRF]; ADC Historical Study No. 10, pp. 80-82; Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Request for Headquarters USAF Guidance on Texas Tower operation and Maintenance,” 26 S.ep 1956 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 19561; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955, pp. 34-38; Ltr and Ind, ADC to ARDC, “Radar Video Remoting,” 12 Jan 1955 [Doc 97 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; Ltr and Incl, RADC to AF Cambridge Research Center, “Use of GPA-37 with Texas Towers, n.d., ca. Feb 1955 [Doc 99 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]ADC, Logistic Support Plan for Texas Towers, 12 Mar 1956’[Doc 140 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956]; Hi-s-t-o-T-ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 44-45; Ltr and Incl, ADC to USAF, “Request for Headquarters USAF Guidance on Texas Tower Operation and Maintenance, 26 Sep 1956 [Doc 37 in Hist of ADC,, 9 Nov 1956 to Ltr and Incl, ADC to USAF, “Request for Headquarters USAF Guidance on Texas Tower Operation and Maintenance,” 26 Sep 1956 [Doc 38 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956]; C&E Digest, Aug 1957, pp. 4-                                                                                                                                                                   4. Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Texas Towers,” 24 Aug 1953 [Doc 92, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; C&E Digest, Jul 1957 pp. 13-15.
5. See Appendix B for Texas Tower Equipment List;
Ltr, ARDC to ADC, “Project Texas Towers,” 26 Sep 1952 [Doc 90,
Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; USAF, “Planning



Guide for Implementation of Texas Towers,” 16 Nov 1953 [Doc



93, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr, Rome Air



Def Center to ADC, “Improvement and Modifications to Production



AN/GPS-37,11 19 Oct 1954 [Doc 100, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC,



Jan-Jun 1955]; Ltr and Atch, MIT to ADC, 24 Feb 1955 [Doc 112, Doc Vol



XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; ADC, “Operational Texas Towers,” 20 Jul 1954 [HRF); ADC, Plan for Texas Towers,” 1 Jul 1956 [HRF]. “Operational Plan for Texas Towers,” 1 Jul 1956



6. ADC Historical Study No. 10, op.cit. , p. 74; “Last of the Texas Towers, AU Review, Vol XVI, No. 1 (Nov-Dec 1964), pp. 92-94; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 70-73.



7. ADC Historical Study No. 10, op.cit., pp. 74-76: “Last of the Texas Towers” AU Review, op.cit. , p. 93; C&E Digest, Jul 1957, 13-15.



9 . EADF, “Operational Plan Texas Tower No. 2,11 1 Sep1955, P. 2 [Doc 98, Docs Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955 ].



10. C&E Digest, Jul 1957, pp. 13-15 and Aug 1957, pp. 1-6.



11. ADC Historical Study No. 10, op.cit., pp. 76, 82-84; ADC, “Operational Plan for Texas Towers, 20 Jul 1954 and 1 Jul 1956 [HRF]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955, pp. 34-36; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955, pp. 67-68; Hist of EADF, Jan-Jun 1956.pp. 64-68; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, p. 64-68 45; ADC, Logistic Support Plan for Texas Towers, 12 Mar 1956 [Doc 140 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956.]



12. ADC, IOC from ADMEL-3, “Trip Report-Texas Towers, [Cont’d] 26 Sep 1955 [Doc 107, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, JanJun 1955); Msg COOPR 30332, CINCNORAD to USAF, 25 Oct 1956 [Doc 109, Doc Vol XIII, Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 19551; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 42-43; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1956, P. 37; Ltr, USAF to ADC “Operational Plan for Texas Tower,” 17 Jun 1955 [Doc 80 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Msg AFOOP OP D 55901, USAF to ADC- 30 Jun 1955 [Doc 100 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; Msg ADOPR 3645, ADC to USAF, 2 Aug 1955 [Doc 103 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1955]; IOC, ADAIE-CA to ADAIE-C, “Construction’Schedule Texas Tower 3 ...” 8 Aug 1956 [Doc 33 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956.]



13. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1955, p. 39, Jan-Jun 1956, pp. 37-38, Jul-Dec 1956, pp.. 41-47; Hist of EADF, Jul-Dec 1956, pp. 69-74, Jan-Jun 1958, pp. 49-50; Hist of ADC, JanJun 1959, pp. 58-59, Jul-Dec 1959, p. 43; IOC, ADAIE-CA to ADAIE-C, “Construction Schedule Texas Tower 3...,” 8 Aug 1956 [Doc 33 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956]; Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 72-73; C&E Digest, Aug 1957, pp. 1-6; IOC, ADOCO-C to DCS/0, “Report of Staff Visit,” 27 Aug 1956, p. 2 [Doc 32 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1956]; C&E Digest, Nov 1958, pp. 4-6; C&E Digest, Apr 1959, p. 14; Ltr, ADC t5-USAF, “Operational Survey of the 26 Air Division (SAGE),” 5 May 1959 [Doc 70 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959].



14. Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959, pp. 59-64, Jul-Dec 1959, pp. 43-46, Jul-Dec 1960, P. 70; Hist of EADF, Jan-Jun 1958, P. 51; Msg EAOCE-ER 1671, EADF to ADC, 11 Sep 1958 [Doc 73 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1959]; Hist of EADF, JanDec 1959, P. 97; C&E Digest, Nov 1961, p.2; Msg ROV-225, ROAMA to AMC, 3 Jul-IDTT-rDoc 70 in Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960]; Western Elect Co., and USAF SAGE Project Office, Progress Report of USAF Air Defense SAGE System, pp. 19, 85, 1Dec 1957, p. 101; Jul 1958, pp. 35, 43, 118; 1 Jan 1959, pp. 20, 81; and 1 Oct-1959, pp. 19, 85.
1515.Hist of ADC Jan-Jun 1960, pp. 48-49; Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, pp. 67-68; Joint Test Staff for SAGE Cateory III Evaluation, Final Report, n.d., ca. 1960, p. U-14 [HRF].
16. Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1960, pp. 70-75.: Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961, pp. 69-84; ADC, “Report of Proceedings of a Board of Officers - Loss of Texas Tower No. 4,11 4 Mar 1961 [Doc 110 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961]; Senate Hearings, Inquiry into the Collapse of Texas Tower No. 4, Hearings Before Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 87 Congress, lst Session, May 3-17, 1961
(Washington:GPO, 1961) [Doc 113 in Hist of ADC, Jan-Jun 1961],
17. Ltr, ADC to USAF, “Report of Board of officers, Texas Tower No. 4,” 4 Mar 1961 [HRF]. 18.Hist of ADC, Jul-Dec 1961, pp. 78-85; NORAD/CONAD Historical Summary, Jul-Dec 1962, pp. 23-27; FORM RESTRICTED DATA, USAF, Current Status Reports, Mar 1962, p. 3-20, Apr 1962, p. 3-20, May 1962, p. 3-19, Jun 1962, p. 3-19, Aug 1962 p. 3-18, Sep 1962, p. 3-16 [HRF]; ADC to ADC Staff Agencies, “USAF Current Status Report - September 1962, “26 Oct 1962 [HRF]; C&E Digest, Nov 1961, pp. 1-5; ADC, Prog Mgt Div, Weekly Act Rept, 14-20 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Ltr, ADC to ADCCS, “Status of Texas Towers 2 and 3”,11 28 Nov 1962 [HRF]; Msg BOOAC-E 0480, BOADS to 26 AD, 4 Sep 1962 [HRF]; Msg AFOOP-DEWC 60997, USAF to ADC, 10 Dec 1962 [HRF]; Msg 260OP-GP 2246, 26 AD to ADC, 17 Dec 1962 [HRF]; Also AFOOP-DELWC 66098, USAF to ADC, 5 Jan 1963 [HRF]; Msg 260AC-E 0622, 26 AD to ADC, 11 Jan 1963 [HRF]; Msg 26IFS 01-91/631 26 AD to ADC, 17 Jan 1963.[HRF].

19. “Last of the Texas Towers, AU Review, op.cit.,

1963 IN CASE OF ATOMIC ATTACK AND THE FAMILY FALLOUT SHELTER A PLEA TO HOUSEWIVES

THIS FILM MADE BY THE OFFICE OF CIVIL DEFENSE AND MOBILIZATION IS PERHAPS ONE OF THE BEST CIVIL DEFENSE ERA PROPAGANDA FILMS! GEARED FOR THE FAMILY MATRIARCH THE HOUSE WIFE THE MOVIE IS A BUNCH OF CARTOON DRAWINGS NARRATED BY A FEMALE VOICE DISCUSSING NUCLEAR ATTACK AS EACH SLIDE IS PRESENTED A AUDIBLE BEEP TONE JUST LIKE THE SLIDE SHOWS THAT HAD A SOUNDTRACK AND USED A BEEP TO GO TO THE NEXT SLIDE (SOME OF US WATCHED THESE TYPES OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS IN THE 70s-1980s IN SCHOOL) IT IS A GREAT ILLUSTRATED FILM AND DELVES INTO HOW THE WIFE AND MOTHER MUST PREPARE OR RISK EXTINCTION OF THE WHOLE FAMILY. STOCKING FOOD,THE ALERT SYSTEM,FALLOUT , AND ON AND ON CLICK ON IT AND WATCH DEFINITELY A GREAT PIECE OF COLD WAR AMERICAN PROPAGANDA!!

CIVIL DEFENSE THE FALLOUT SHELTER YEARS "FALLOUT SHELTER GEAR" 1960-1979

THE FALLOUT SHELTER SIGN IGNORED AND FADING ON BUILDINGS ACROSS THE UNITED STATES , PART OF A FEDERAL PLAN TO SAVE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IN THE EVENT OF A INCOMING SOVIET ATTACK, PART OF A LEGACY WHEN A YOUNG PRESIDENT WENT AND URGED AMERICANS TO BUILD FALLOUT SHELTERS OR PARTICIPATE IN THE FEDERAL ONE IN A ISSUE OF LIFE MAGAZINE THAT SPARKED A SHELTER BUILDING  CRAZE THAT LASTED A LITTLE OVER A YEAR AND FORCED CITY,MUNICIPAL,&COUNTIES TO LOCATE BUILDINGS WITH PROTECTIVE FACTORS-PF FROM FALLOUT AND ENOUGH SPACE TO ACCOMODATE A CIVILIAN POPULATION FOR AT LEAST 2 WEEKS FOOD, WATER, SANITATION, BEDDING, TO BE STOCKED PRIOR TO OCCUPYING BY CIVIL DEFENSE SOME SHELTERS WERE STOCKED AND REMAIN THAT WAY, I HAVE BEEN CALLED TO VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN NYC WHILE A BUILDING SUPER OR A PARKING GARAGE OWNER IS CLEANING OUT HUNDREDS OF CRACKER TINS AND WATER DRUMS RUSTED AND BULGING, CIVIL DEFENSE LOGO STILL VISIBLE ON WATER DAMAGED BOXES AND RUSTED WATER BARRELS, I ALWAYS HOPE TO COME ACROSS ONE OF THE MANY CIVIL DEFENSE ITEMS THAT I CONSIDER MY HOLY GRAIL ,I KNOW I WILL CONTINUE TO SEE THIS HAPPEN MORE AND MORE  AND STOP FINDING LESS PILLAGED SITES ON MY OWN AS THESE STOCKED RATIONS ARE WAY BEYOND THEIR SHELF LIFE AND ARE HOW NYC RATS STAY HEALTHY BUT ONE CONSTANT IS THE FALLOUT SHELTER SIGN 75% ARE SO SCREWED INTO CONCRETE OR BRICK THEY ARE NOT GOING ANYWHERE AT 50 YRS OLD NOT AS REFLECTIVE AND VIVID THEY STILL ARE A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND ARE PART OF THE NYC LANDSCAPE  I HOPE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME.

NYC RESIDENTS WHY THEY NEVER PLANNED ON USING THE FALLOUT SHELTER

VIEW PHOTO IN GALLERY

Images: A model fallout shelter, 1955. Image Wiki Commons

Decades after the end of the Cold War, ominous black-and-yellow fallout shelter signs still mark buildings across New York City’s five boroughs. The actual number of designated fallout shelters in the city is difficult to discern. What is known is that by 1963, an estimated 18,000 shelters had been designated, and the Department of Defense had plans to add another 34,000 shelters citywide.

While the presence of a fallout shelter in one’s building may have given some residents peace of mind in an era when nuclear destruction seemed imminent, in reality, most of New York’s fallout shelters were little more than basements marked by an official government sign.

A small percentage of shelters were fortified underground bunkers stocked with emergency supplies, but these were rare and primarily built for high-ranking government officials. The majority of shelters, including nearly all those that were visibly marked, were known as “community shelters,” and by all accounts, they offered little special protection. Inspector guidelines simply indicated that “community shelters” should be kept free of trash and debris and have a ventilation system that can provide a “safe and tolerable environment for a specified shelter occupancy time.” Regulations for the ventilation systems appeared to be open to interpretation, leaving individual inspectors to determine which of the city’s windowless basements would ultimately make the cut.

A December 1961 article in Popular Mechanics featured the above chart to help people determine when it might be safe to leave their fallout shelter and how long it would take to return to “normal life.”

What is now now clear is that had New York experienced a nuclear attack, most fallout shelters would have done little or nothing to protect residents from fallout. There is also evidence, however, that some New Yorkers had no intention of evacuating to a local shelter either way. In fact, at the time, many city residents appeared as concerned about the negative side effects of fallout shelter living as they were about radiation.

A still from the 1964 government produced film, Public Shelter Living: The Story of Shelter 104, which dramatized fallout shelter living.

The Social and Psychological Side Effects of Fallout Shelter Life

In the 1960s, many New Yorkers firmly believed that being trapped inside a windowless basement for days and even weeks with their neighbors may be potentially more harmful than being showered with nuclear fallout. That’s right—for many, toxic neighbors were considered an even greater threat than toxic fallout.

To be fair, New Yorkers were not alone in fearing the idea of being trapped in a windowless basement with their neighbors for days and weeks on end. By the late 1960s, the Office of Civil Defense was studying the potential social problems raised by fallout shelters, and in some cases, carrying out fallout shelter simulations. In one study, carried out in Athens, Georgia, 63 of the study’s 750 participants left within the first 15 hours. In the end, most studies had similar results with a relatively high percentage of participants fleeing shelters only hours into the simulations.

An October 1960 feature in Popular Mechanics provided educational advice on fallout and how to avoid it.

Nevertheless, the Office of Civil Defense attempted to put a positive spin on the results, noting that participants who were able to stick it out often emerged feeling stronger and more prepared for the event of an actual nuclear attack. They also asserted that with the right precautions, the recognized psychological effects of living in a fallout shelter, which include severe depression, can be mitigated.

A 1963 study by the Office of Civil Defense recognized that “each person will be a victim of severe stresses to his need system so that a new, overall need may emerge, to get out, away from the multiple stresses.” But this need, which the study suggests may be as strong as the desire for group acceptance, a Cadillac, or smoking, can be controlled by ensuring the shelter is a hopeful, calm, and most importantly, well managed environment. Acknowledging that “poor management will result in an inferior adjustment and attitude on the part of shelter occupants,” by the mid 1960s, the Office of Civil Defense had launched a fallout shelter manager training program to ensure that every fallout shelter would also have a live-in superintendent.

Unfortunately, in New York, going crazy or suffering from severe depression in the close company of one’s neighbors wasn’t the only problem residents feared facing if forced to take refuge underground.

Idealized American fallout shelter, around 1957. Image via Wiki Commons

The Quality of New York City’s Fallout Shelters

While designated shelters in some neighborhoods were pristine and equipped with emergency supplies, in other areas of the city, they were considered too hazardous to enter. One 1963 article in the New York Times profiled a fallout shelter running under three tenements on East 131 Street in Harlem. Reports indicated that the shelters were full of leaking raw sewage, garbage, and rats. “Who’d want to go down there?” one local resident told a reporter. “If fallout came, I’d just run.” Asked about the designated shelter, another woman in the neighborhood said that in it, “rats are as big as dogs and run through the house like horses.”

With typical New York City resolve, officials noted that if people were already living in the tenements above, they could certainly survive in the basement for a week to 10 days in the face of radioactive fallout. After all, survival not luxury was the objective. According to the article, however, most local East Harlem residents had already concluded that exposure to radioactive fallout would potentially pose fewer risks.

Fallout Shelters Today

By the late 1970s, many New Yorkers were more concerned about the rotting food in the city’s fallout shelters than they were with a pending nuclear threat and with good reason. In the 1960s, an estimated $30 million worth of food had been stashed away in basements across the New York City area. Two decades later this food had started to attract roaches, rats, and sometimes, vandals. For this reason, long before the Cold War was officially over, many residential fallout shelters were already being cleaned out and reclaimed as storage spaces or converted into more other types of common spaces from laundry rooms to fitness rooms.

Whatever the purpose, these windowless basement common spaces are still not a favorite of most tenants, but if you happen to have one in your building, it is worth noting that while the average load of laundry takes only 40 minutes, the average stay in a community fallout shelter was expected to last at least 10 days, and in some cases, much longer.

I Think That This Letter From President Kennedy Speaks Volumes As To The Countries Frame Of Mind During The Cold War. This Letter To Read Is A Very Serious Indication About What The Government Thought The Near Future Might Hold For Its Citizens. Between The Vibe In Berlin To The Cuban Missile Crisis This Letter Must Of Seemed As Though The President Was Warning The American Public That An Atomic War Is Going To Start Soon. 

FAllOUT SHELTER SIGNS CAME WITH A SHEET OF STICK ON LETTERS AND NUMBERS AS WELL AS OCCUPANCY CIRCLES TO ADD TO THE STANDARD SIGN. THIS HERE INDICATES WHERE THE SHELTER STARTS.


(THE TEXT BELOW IS THE NATIONAL CODE TO FOLLOW CONCERNING SHELTERS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)

  THE NATIONAL FALLOUT SHELTER  

The National Fallout Shelter Sign will be a familiar sight all over the United States next year. It will mark buildings and other facilities as areas where 50 or more persons can be sheltered from radioactive fallout resulting from a nuclear attack.
The fallout sign will be used only to mark Federally approved buildings surveyed by architect-engineer firms under contract to the Department of Defense.In awarding the contract for design of the sign to graphic arts studios it was designated the services of a psychologist be obtained to recommend a visual symbol that could be easily identified and remembered. The sign had to meet the psychological requirements of simplicity, easy identification, retention, and arresting color combination.It had to be simple enough to be easily identified by children, non-English speaking persons or others who may not be able to read. The color combination, yellow and black, is considered as the most easily identified attention getter by psychologists in the graphic arts industry. The sign can be seen and recognized at distances up to 200 feet.


The shelter symbol on the sign is a black circle set against a yellow rectangular background. Inside the circle, three yellow triangles are arranged in geometric pattern with apex of the triangle pointing down. Below the fallout symbol, lettered in yellow against black, are the words Fallout Shelter in plain block letters. Yellow directional arrows are located directly underneath the lettering which will indicate the location of the shelter.                                                                                        PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTERS




Public fallout shelters are facilities providing protection from fallout radiation which are intended for use by the general public during emergency periods. These do not include private fallout shelters in residences and other buildings which are not intended to be available to the general public, although the standards are the same for both.


Basic Considerations
Public fallout shelters have but one purpose–to provide the minimum necessary protection from fallout radiation in a minimum life-sustaining environment. The minimum protection level for public fallout shelters is PF 40. The minimum life-sustaining environment consists of a supply of drinking water, tolerable temperature and humidity (these are combined in a human comfort factor called effective temperature), sanitary facilities, adequate fresh air, and low-level lighting if natural light is not available in the shelter. These are the basic elements covered in the standard for public fallout shelters.
The standard for public fallout shelters includes a few other items which relate to a general concern for the public safety and welfare, such as access and egress, fire safety, and proximity of hazardous materials or systems. These considerations are addressed in all building codes. They are included in the standard for public fallout shelters, not because they are essential to the purpose of protecting occupants from fallout radiation or to sustaining life, but because prudent design for the public safety requires their consideration. In addition, the standard includes consideration of fallout shelter supplies and their storage. These are not required for a public fallout shelter, but their presence may be desirable in otherwise austere living conditions.
Dual Use


Public fallout shelters need not be separate, single-use facilities. Indeed, all buildings offer some degree of fallout protection; although some buildings provide better protection than others, and not all have protection factors high enough to qualify as public fallout shelters. This characteristic of inherent radiation shielding in all buildings, with PF 40 or better shielding in some, makes it possible to designate either all or parts of some buildings as public fallout shelters. The buildings or spaces therein which may be designated as public fallout shelters typically have an everyday use, and in that sense they are called dual-purpose shelters. Most public fallout shelters are of this type.


Identifying The Shelter


Since it often is the case that only part of a building will provide protection of PF 40 or better, the suitable shelter space must be identified for users, including its boundaries and limits. Diagrams of floor plans are one way to do this; trained shelter managers offer another way. A Minimum Standard
As is the case with most building standards, minimum criteria which meet the intended objectives are given in the standard for public fallout shelters. The principal reason is to keep the cost for meeting the standard to the lowest possible level and yet meet the desired objectives. Accordingly, there should be no hesitation to exceed the standard for public fallout shelters, provided that the particular building situation and economics permit.


Radiation Shielding
As indicated in the description of the radiation hazard above, the fundamental objective of a fallout shelter is that it provide protection from fallout radiation for occupants. Suitable radiation shielding is the most important feature that any shelter offers and should be given priority attention in establishing any fallout shelter.
Higher protection factor values, if they can be achieved with little or no extra effort, are especially worthy of consideration. The advantages of minimizing the amount of radiation that a person receives are indicated in the preceding discussion of radiation effects upon living tissue. The ultimate measure of the amount of radiation received, of course, is the protection factor. If protection factors greater than PF 40 can be achieved, they certainly should be provided.


Temperature


The maximum effective temperature value for public fallout shelters is higher than would be permitted in spaces used daily. The effective temperature value of 82°F (28°C) for public fallout shelters is an upper limit of tolerance for sedentary people, and should not be exceeded. Fully occupied fallout shelters in warm, humid climates are especially likely to produce effective temperatures in excess of the upper limit value unless large air-flow volumes are provided.
Because heat buildup occurs in a relatively closed fallout shelter at full or nearly full occupancy, a minimum dry-bulb temperature of 50°F (10°C) normally can be maintained without adding heat to the space. Dry-bulb temperatures that are too high will be the usual situation rather than temperatures that are too low for comfort.


Ventilation
Proper ventilation of fallout shelters is, perhaps, the second most important consideration. Fresh air–that is, oxygen–is essential to sustain life. Ordinarily, this is not a great concern for buildings which are designed for daily use. We take for granted that a fresh air supply is introduced into building spaces through normal ventilation, which may be either natural air flow or mechanically driven airflow.
Fallout shelters present new ventilation problems. First, the very purpose of a fallout shelter usually results in it being a relatively closed space, possibly a basement or an interior space. Natural ventilation is restricted in such circumstances, and mechanical (forced) ventilation cannot be relied upon, because electric power cannot be assured to remain available during and after a period of nuclear attack. Second, when a fallout shelter is fully occupied up to its limit, which is one person in every 10 square feet of floor area, the consumption of oxygen, discharge of carbon dioxide, buildup of unpleasant odors, and heat and moisture buildup from occupants combine to create nearly intolerable conditions in spaces which have poor or no ventilation.For these reasons, the ventilation system of a fallout shelter must be carefully checked. If natural ventilation is to be used, then the air-flow volume must be sufficient to meet the health and comfort conditions as prescribed in publication TR-20 (Volume 3), Shelter Environmental Support Systems, Appendix C, “Ventilation Requirements for Fallout Shelters,” May 1978 edition, available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. If deficiencies are found, then either the shelter occupancy must be reduced, or forced ventilation must be provided. If forced ventilation is to be used, then a reliable power supply to the fans must be assured to maintain the required air-flow volume.


Potable Water


A supply of drinking water is the only other feature of public fallout shelters which is essential to sustain life for periods longer than just a few days. Accordingly, provision must be made for the needed water. 3.5 gallons of potable water per shelter occupant are to be provided. This amount is based upon a 14-day shelter stay-time, or one quart per day, and is for drinking purposes only. No other uses are included in the base amount. If other uses of water are expected in the fallout shelter, such as for sanitary purposes, then the storage capacity must be increased.There are several ways in which the required drinking water can be provided in a fallout shelter. The one way not to be counted upon is the public water main. Public water supply systems are likely to be disrupted during a period of nuclear attack–either due to power failure which could render pumping stations inoperative or due to breakage of the water lines at some remote point. This means that the emergency water supply must be at or near the fallout shelter–either storage tank(s) or a well at the site. Water can be stored either in permanently installed tanks or in individual containers. Occasionally, it will be possible to obtain the required water from that trapped in building lines. In such cases, a suitably located outlet valve will be needed to withdraw the water.



YOUR VERY BASIC DODFS-1 1963 DESIGN BUILDING MARKER DESIGNATING SHELTER WITHIN BUILDING , FALLOUT SHELTER SIGN STICKER KITS ALLOWED FOR OPTIONAL MESSAGES LIKE ABOVE "STARTS HERE" ALSO "CAPACITY" AND "NUMBERS" WERE USED AND "ARROWS" DIRECTING THE PUBLIC TO SHELTER SPACES

JUST LIKE THE FALLOUT SHELTER SIGN ABOVE THESE CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICIALS ARE PUTTING THE OPTIONAL "STARTS HERE" DECAL ON THE LOWER HALF OF THE SIGN

ANOTHER PUBLIC SHELTER BECOMES PART OF THE NATIONAL FALLOUT SHELTER PLAN AND MOUNTING THE FALLOUT SHELTER PLACARD WAS THE BASIC GRAND OPENING

ONE OF THE WATER BARRELS OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE  FALLOUT SHELTER STOCK, EVEN THOUGH THIS WATER BARREL IS RUSTED AND AGED THANKS TO THE PLASTIC BAG LINER OF STURDY DESIGN WATER CAN STILL BE STORED IN THIS CONTAINER

 

BELIEVE IT OR NOT SHELTERS IN NYC OR TRI STATE NY,NJ,CT DO HAVE SHELTERS WITH STOCK IN THIS CONDITION

ONE OF MY HOLY GRAIL FINDS WOULD BE AN UNOPENED  MEDICAL KIT EVERY ONE I HAVE COME ACROSS WAS PILLAGED EVEN THOUGH IT SAID IN VERY LARGE LETTERS "NO NARCOTICS INSIDE"

THE ABOVE  LETTER FROM THE DOD IS ASKING A COUNTY TO SURVEY A NIKE ANTI AIR MISSILE  MAGAZINE THAT IS ABANDONDED  AS A SPACE FOR A FALLOUT SHELTER



Suffolk County ,Long Island New York  Had Developed A Community Shelter Plan By 1969 It Was Mass Mailed To Every Postal Address In The County , There Is A Post On This Blog Showing The Plan And Describing The Various Shelters What They Actually Looked Like. I Spent My Spare Time Crawling Around Alot Of These Fallout Shelters And Most Were Never Stocked And The Majority As Of 2010 Do Not Exist. These Days You are On Your Own And FEMA Calls It "Shelter In Place" Basically Where ever You Are Is Your Fallout Shelter. Even As The Cold War Has Ended The Importance Of Having A Safe Place Is Important Too Many Of The Old Guard Who Remember The Power Of Nuclear Weapons Are Passing On. The People Who Saw Hiroshima And Nagasaki The People Who Tested These Weapons Built Them Even Those That Lived In The Fear Of Them Being Used Are Growing Old And Passing On Soon Nobody Will Remember The Horror That Can Be Unleashed And The Power Of The Weapon And Someone Will Use It In Anger, And People Will No Longer Be Around Having Gone Away Just Like The Dinosaur's Did.



THE SHELTER MANAGER   GUIDE IS USUALLY TAPED OR PLACED IN A SHELTER IT EXPLAINS IF YOU PICK THIS UP AND BREAK THE SEAL(shelter manager and management fema) YOU ARE TAKING  ON THE DUTY  OF SHELTER MANAGER BE THE VOICE OF REASON AND NEVER TAKE SIDES AND WHATEVER YOU SAY IS THE LAST OF IT, PLUS IT KEEPS RECORDS OF SHELTER LIFE ,INVENTORY,SHELTER OCCUPANTS BACKGROUND AND A LOG.

THIS BOEING PLANT GUARD HAD PUBLIC SAFETY DUTIES AS WELL AS RADIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT TO MONITOR THE BOEING PLANT SHELTER

 SOME AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES HAD LARGE PLACES TO STORE SUPPLIES AND BIG COMPANIES LIKE MONTSANTO,BOEING, STOCKED LARGE AMOUNTS TO SHELTER THEIR EMPLOYEES AND FAMILIES THESE COMPANIES HAD US DEFENSE CONTRACTS AND THEIR SURVIVAL WAS IMPORTANT TO GETTING POST ATTACK AMERICA BUILDING AGAIN ACCORDING TO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PLANS.



THE RADIOLOGICAL CIVIL  DEFENSE  EQUIPMENT PILFERED FROM COUNTY EOC's IN THE EARLY 1990s MAY HAVE BEEN THE THOUGHT THAT SINCE THE BERLIN WALL WAS TORN DOWN RUSSIA HAS SEPERATED INTO REPUBLICS THAT THESE DEVICES WOULD NOT GO MISSING , WELL WHEN E-BAY STARTED THESE METERS WERE BEING SOLD BY THE TRUCKLOAD AND FULL KITS WENT FOR LESS THAN THE ORIGINAL PRICE, THIS IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN CIVIL DEFENSE AND THAT IS THE RADIOLOGICAL TEAM MONITORING YOUR AREA BY CAR,PLANE AND ON FOOT CONSTANTLY TAKING READINGS AND THE SHELTER IS DEPENDENT ON THESE MEN & WOMEN THAT WERE RADEF MONITORS

I HAVE NOT MET A SURVEY METER I DID NOT LIKE.

THE COMMUNITY SHELTER PLAN CAUSED MOST OF THE BUILDINGS THAT WERE PUBLIC LIKE SCHOOLS, COURTS, HOSPITALS TO INCORPORATE COMMUNITY SHELTERS IN TO BUILDING PLANS SPACE THAT WAS FUNCTIONAL BUT QUICKLY COULD BE TURNED INTO SHELTERS THAT AFFORDED PROTECTION, SCHOOLS FOLLOW THIS BUILDING STYLE AND PROVIDED SPACE FOR SUPPLIES TO BE KEPT AND USUALLY THE SCHOOLS LOCKER ROOM WERE DESIGNED TO ALLOW FOR USE AS A SHOWER AREA FOR SHELTEREES.

 STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTERS

Purpose

Section 1.0. The purpose of this standard is to establish minimum criteria for application to the design, construction, or designation of a space in a building or other facility as a fallout shelter.

 Scope

 Section 2.0. The scope of this standard extends to buildings, spaces, or other facilities designated for use as public fallout shelters.

 Section 2.1. The standard establishes technical, architectural, and environmental criteria for public fallout shelters.

 General

Section 3.0. The standard furnishes minimum criteria which provide for the protection of occupants from nuclear fallout radiation in spaces whose habitability and environmental characteristics are governed by the prevailing emergency situation and the essential lifesaving purpose of the fallout shelter. The criteria to be met typically are different from criteria ordinarily required for buildings and spaces having an everyday use.

Section 3.1. The standard indicates objectives to be met in the design and designation of fallout shelters in new and existing buildings. If all of the objectives cannot be met, then primary consideration shall be given to providing radiation shielding. In such instances, plans shall be developed to include the other fallout shelter features at a later time.

 Section 3.2. This standard for public fallout shelters is a minimum standard. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to preclude exceeding this standard for any fallout shelter, except as may cause noncompliance with other requirements for the shelter space which may be prescribed in the local building codes.

Definitions

Section 4.0. The following definitions shall apply to all portions of this standard.

FALLOUT SHELTER is any room, structure, or space designated as such and providing its occupants with protection at a minimum protection factor (PF) of 40 from fallout radiation resulting from a nuclear explosion.

PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTER is any fallout shelter which is intended for use by or is accessible to the general public. Fallout shelters which are a part of a private residence and are intended for private use are not included.

SINGLE-PURPOSE FALLOUT SHELTER is a fallout shelter having no use or occupancy except as a fallout shelter.

DUAL-USE FALLOUT SHELTER is a fallout shelter having a normal, routine use and occupancy as well as an emergency use as a fallout shelter.

PROTECTION FACTOR, sometimes abbreviated as PF, is a numerical value which expresses the relation between the amount of fallout radiation that would be received in a protected location and the amount that would be received if unprotected in the same location.

EFFECTIVE TEMPERATURE is an empirical index which combines in a single number the effects of temperature, humidity, and air movement on the sensation of warmth and cold felt by the human body.

 UNIT OF EGRESS WIDTH is 22 in.

 Occupancy

Section 5.0. General. Nothing in this standard shall be construed as preventing the dual use or multiple use of normal occupancy space as fallout shelter space, providing the minimum requirements for each are met.

sec 5.1. Mixed Occupancy. The occupancy classification shall be determined by the normal use of a building or space. When a normal-use space is designed to have an emergency use as a fallout shelter in addition to the normal use, the most restrictive requirements for all such uses shall be met.

 Section 5.2. Occupancy Separation. No occupancy separation is required between that portion of the space designed as a public fallout shelter and the remainder of the building. A plan indicating the fallout shelter space and its boundaries shall be furnished as a means of identifying the fallout shelter.

Section 5.3. Space. Space allowances for use as a fallout shelter shall be as follows.

 (a) Floor Area. A minimum of 10 sq. ft. of net floor area shall be provided per shelter occupant. Partitions, columns, areas occupied by moveable furniture or other materials within the fallout shelter space, and any areas within the fallout shelter space used for storage of shelter supplies may be included in net area.

(b) Head Room. A minimum head room of 6.5 ft. shall be provided.

(c) Volume. A minimum of 65 cu. ft. of net volume shall be provided per shelter occupant. Net volume shall be determined using the net area calculated for the space.

Protection

Section 6.0. The minimum level of protection for public fallout shelters is PF 40. Protection factors shall be calculated using methods approved by the Federal Emergency Management Agency based upon publication TR-20 (Volume 1), Shelter Design and Analysis–Fallout Radiation Shielding, June 1976 edition.

Ventilation and Temperature

Section 7.0. Ventilation of the fallout shelter space shall comply with the standards of Appendix C, TR-20 (Volume 3), Shelter Environmental Support Systems, May 1978 edition, available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Section 7.1. Fresh Air. A minimum of 3 cu. ft. of fresh air per minute per fallout shelter occupant shall be provided to prevent oxygen depletion and carbon dioxide buildup in the fallout shelter.

Section 7.2. Effective Temperature. The fallout shelter shall have a ventilation rate sufficient to maintain a daily average effective temperature of not more than 82°F (28°C) with at least a 90-percent reliability of not exceeding that value during the year. Effective temperatures shall be determined using procedures contained in the Handbook of Fundamentals, 1977 edition, prepared by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. (ASHRAE). Zones of equal ventilation rates in cu. ft. of air per minute which meet the requirements of this section are shown in Figure 1.

Section 7.3. Ventilation Systems. Ventilation systems for public fallout shelters shall be designed to provide the ventilation rates required by Section 7.2. during periods when electric power may not be available from public service utilities. Emergency electrical generators or positive natural ventilation flow for fallout shelters may be used to meet this requirement.

Section 7.4. Temperature. A temperature of not less than 50°F (10°C) shall be maintained in the fallout shelter during the occupancy period.

 Section 7.5. Air Intake. Ventilation systems shall be designed so that the outside air intake opening is positioned not less than 2-ft. above any surface on which radioactive fallout could be deposited. The air intake opening shall be hooded or positioned to prevent deposits of radioactive fallout on the intake face.

Section 7.6. Filters. Special filters are not required for ventilation systems for public fallout shelters. No filters are required for fallout shelter ventilation equipment if the face velocity at the outside air intake is less than 150 ft. per minute.

Lighting

Section 8.0. No special lighting is required for fallout shelters which receive natural light. Spaces without windows, above or below ground, shall be provided with a minimum lighting level of 2 footcandles at the floor. Normal lighting fixtures may be used for this purpose if they are powered by an emergency generator, or battery-operated lights may be used.

Structural

Section 9.0. Structural design of the fallout shelter shall comply with the local building codes. No special structural arrangements are required for public fallout shelters.

Section 9.1. Minimum Design Loads.

(a) Minimum Design Loads for Dual-Use Fallout Shelters. The design live load required for normal use shall apply for dual-use fallout shelters.

(b) Minimum Design Loads for Single-Purpose Fallout Shelters. The minimum design live load for floors in single-purpose fallout shelters shall be 40 lb. per sq. ft. The minimum design live load for roofs of single-purpose fallout shelters shall comply with the requirements of the local building codes.

Access and Egress

Section 10.0. Public fallout shelters shall have no fewer than two widely separated means of access and egress leading to other spaces of the building or directly to the outdoors.

Section 10.1. Means of access and egress for dual-purpose fallout shelters shall meet the requirements prescribed by the local building codes for normal, routine use of the space.

Section 10.2. Means of access and egress for single-purpose fallout shelters shall aggregate at least one unit of egress width for every 200 fallout shelter occupants. In no case shall a single opening be less than 24-in, wide.

Section 10.3. Emergency-type hatchways may be used as a means of access and egress, provided that at least one means of access and egress for the fallout shelter is a standard opening conforming to the requirements of the local building codes. Hatchways, if used, shall be a minimum size of 24-in. x 36-in.

Fire Resistance

Section 11.0. Fallout shelters shall meet fire-safety requirements as indicated below.

(a) Dual-purpose fallout shelters shall comply with requirements applicable for normal occupancy of the space.

(b) Single-purpose fallout shelters shall provide a flame-spread rating for interior surfaces not exceeding 200 on the flame spread scale and 450 or less on the smoke test scale when tested in accordance with ASTM E-84.

Hazards

Section 12.0. Hazardous utility lines, such as steam, gas, and oil lines, shall not be located in or near the fallout shelter unless provision is made to control such lines by valving or other approved means which permits shut-off of flow through the fallout shelter. Valving or other controls shall be readily accessible from the fallout shelter and shall conform with the local mechanical and gas codes.

Sanitation

Section 13.0. Toilets, either flush-type operating from the normal water supply system, or chemical or other types, shall be provided on the basis of one toilet per 50 fallout shelter occupants. Toilets may be outside the fallout shelter in other portions of the building provided that they may be reached by occupants of the fallout shelter without exposure to direct fallout radiation as defined in TR-20 (Volume 1), Shelter Design and Analysis–Fallout Radiation Shielding, June 1976 edition, available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Austere provisions, such as empty water containers, for disposal of waste may be considered as fulfilling this requirement.

Drinking Water

Section 14.0. A minimum of 3.5 gallons of potable water shall be available for each fallout shelter occupant. If it cannot reasonably be assumed that the public water supply system will be operational at all times when the fallout shelter may be occupied, then other means shall be provided for meeting this requirement. Storage tanks, trapped potable water in building lines, or auxiliary water wells at or near the premises may be used to fulfill this requirement.

Supplies and Storage

Section 15.0. Consideration shall be given to fallout shelter supplies and their storage, but provision of such supplies is not required. Supplies and other storage considerations for public fallout shelters are discussed in publication CPG 1-19, Guidance for Development of An Emergency Fallout Shelter Stocking Plan, July 1978, available from the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Section 15.1. Radiation-measuring instruments, which may be furnished by the Federal Government for fallout shelters, shall be accommodated in secure storage space within the fallout shelter.

THIS CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTIVE  EMERGENCY RATIONS AND EQUIPMENT FOR CIVILIANS TO SURVIVE A TWO WEEK STAY IN A PUBLIC FALLOUT SHELTERS IS THE REQUIREMENTS NEEDED TO DO SO AS DIRECTED FROM CIVIL DEFENSE

Thanks to the Civil Defense Museum For Use Of Some Of The Artwork in This Post.

civildefensemuseum.com is Probably The Biggest and most Informative Places on Cold War Civil Defense From Sirens to Shelters Check it out